The 'Curse' of Eastern Blood in Ismail Kadare’s Elegy for Kosovo. by Kokobobo, Ani
KU ScholarWorks | http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
The “Curse” of Eastern Blood in Ismail 
Kadare’s Elegy for Kosovo.
2010
by Ani Kokobobo
This work has been made available by the University of Kansas 
Libraries’ Office of Scholarly Communication and Copyright.
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this article benefits you.
This is the published version of the article, made available with the 
permission of the publisher.  The original published version can be 
found at the link below.
Kokobobo, Ani. (2010) The “Curse of Eastern Blood in Ismail Kadare’s 
Elegy for Kosovo. Ulbandus Review, 13, 79-93.
Published version: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25748215
Terms of Use: http://www2.ku.edu/~scholar/docs/license.shtml
The "Curse" of Eastern Blood 
in Ismail Kadare's Elegy for Kosovo. 
Am Kokobobo 
Columbia University 
As Maria Todorova concludes in her study Imagining the Balkans, despite 
being bound to Europe geographically, the Balkans are often "culturally 
constructed (by the West) as the other within."1 Over the years, violence 
and particularly violent infighting have grown into a "leitmotiv"2 for 
Balkan otherness, as the area and its people have been "popularly defined 
by violence, incivility, even barbarism."3 The associations of the region 
with violence grew into a defining characteristic during the end of the 
nineteenth-century, and continued to rise to prominence during the 
Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth-century. These patterns of 
thinking about the Balkans returned to dominate public discourse after 
the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, as well as the 
subsequent violent conflicts in Kosovo. In fact, as Tomislav Longinovic" 
shows in his study Vampires Like Us: Writing Down "the serbs,'A the Kosovo 
crisis coupled with the NATO intervention that followed, led to 
representations and demonizations of Serbs in the Western press as 
savage or vampiric others. 
Scholars construe such perceptions of the Balkans as Europe's other to 
be a variant of Orientalist thinking, comparable to Western perceptions 
of the "Orient" as defined by Edward Said. Sai'd argues that Orientalism 
is "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's 
special place in European Western experience."5 In Said's understanding, 
the Western experience of the Orient consists of "setting itself against the 
Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self."6 The image of 
the Orient has thus less to do with its people or culture, than with the 
Western European need for a point of contrast to its own identity. Nor is 
the Western construction of the Orient limited to discourse alone. As 
Said argues, this construct becomes a way for Europe to dominate the 
1 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
188. 
2 Ibid., 122. 
3 Milica Bakiö-Hayden and Robert Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 
'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," Slavic Review 51, 
1992, 3. 
4 VampimLike Us: Writing Down "the serbs" (Belgrade: Belgrade Circle 2005.) 
5 Orientalism. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 1 
6 Ibid., 3. 
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East, to control it verbally as well as socially and politically7 In this 
schema, then, the Balkans are clumped with Eastern cultures in the role 
of the European 'other.' In the case of the Balkans, instead of 
"orientalism" we face a phenomenon like "balkanism," which was 
devised by Todorova to account for the lack of colonial experience in the 
Balkans and for the added nuances of violent infighting.8 
The existence and persistence of such models in the Western mindset 
raises the question of how outside perceptions influence Balkan self-
perception. "It is virtually axiomatic," writes Todorova, "that, by and 
large, a negative self-perception hovers over the Balkans next to a 
strongly disapproving and disparaging outside perception."9 Yet Balkan 
nations do not simply internalize negative outside perceptions, but also 
the Orientalist schema as a whole. Versions of Orientalism exist among 
Balkan peoples, enabling Balkan nations to characterize their neighbors as 
more or less Eastern, and thus construct their own identity as Western. 
(Such labels have little or nothing to do with actual geography.) 
Baki<5-Hayden (1995) has developed the notion of "nesting 
orientalisms" to explicate this phenomenon. She characterizes "nesting 
orientalisms" as a "pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy 
upon which Orientalism is premised." In this pattern, Asia is more 'East' 
or other than Eastern Europe; within Eastern Europe itself this gradation 
is reproduced and the Balkans are perceived as most Eastern."10 Such 
patterns have a profound effect on how the various 'others' of Europe 
view neighboring nations. Todorova, who extends Bakic-Hayden's 
scheme of "nesting orientalisms" by applying its principles to individual 
Balkan nations, argues that the following patterns of sWfting orientalism 
are persistent in the region. She sketches out an entire East/West 
gradation as it applies to Balkan nations. According to this model: 
A Serb is an "Easterner" to a Slovene, but a Bosnian could be an 
"Easterner" to a Serb although geographically situated to the West; the same 
applies to the Albanians who, situated in the western Balkans, are perceived 
as Easternmost by the rest of the Balkan nations [...] With the exception of 
the Turks, in whose self-identity the East occupies a definite, although 
intensely discussed, place, all other Balkan nations have renounced what 
they perceive as East and think of themselves as, if incompletely Western, 
certainly not Eastern [...] Although competing in their pretense to be more 
"European" than the rest, and creating their internal hierarchies of more or 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Todorova 1-20. 
9 Ibid., 38. 
1 0 Milica Bakid-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia," 
Slavic Review 54 (1995), 918. 
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less "orientalized" members, the only constituents who are brandished by 
an vdtimate and absolute "orientalness" are the Turks. 1 1 
If this Orientalist schema casts Slovenia as the most 'Western' Balkan 
country, then it simultaneously corners Albania and leaves it with fewer 
'others' to assist the buildup of a positive self-image. Serbs use the 
Bosnians as their Eastern others, the Slovenes use the Serbs, whereas 
Albanians are left with relatively fewer nation-scapegoats. Certainly, 
construing everyone else as Eastern and oneself as fundamentally 
European is always a way to negotiate such a cultural conundrum. The 
various nationalistic theories that posit modern-day Albanians as the 
descendants of the ancient Pelasgians — about whom, incidentally, we 
know very little archaeologically and historically - and thus the oldest, 
most autochthonous nation in the Balkans, is one possible response to 
being forced in the Eastern corner. 
But there is also another possibility. Over the years, every 
modernization initiative in Albania has been profoundly Orientalist in 
nature. This discourse had its beginnings in the Albanian National 
Renaissance during the nineteenth-century, when Albanian intellectuals 
saw Albania as Western and the occupying Ottoman Empire as Eastern.12 
Albanian Renaissance poets like Nairn Frasheri paint a picture of 
medieval Albania prior to the Ottoman occupation as an oasis of Western 
civilization. This medieval Albania is a land in which "wisdom, peace, 
prosperity, honor, justice, love, friendship..." reign.13 Yet, just at this 
pivotal time, the Ottoman Empire came to disrupt Albania's progress. 
"A great savagery came out of Asia," writes Frasheri about the Ottoman 
Empire. He then continues by saying that the Ottoman Empire put an 
end to the Albanian era of peace and prosperity as it "covered the world 
with a shadow."14 The Eastern enemy is depicted as bringing violence and 
misery wherever it sets foot. 
This obviously Orientalist scheme of idyllic medieval Albania, whose 
bright future was derailed by the Eastern other, was perpetuated both 
during Ahmet Zogu's reign and during Enver Hoxha's socialist regime in 
Albania. In fact, despite vast differences between their political agendas 
and leadership styles, both leaders presented their political endeavors as 
modernization campaigns. Specifically, they presented their own 
governments as efforts to rid Albania of Eastern backwardness. 
1 1 Todorova 58. 
1 2 For an overview of Orientalism in Albania, see: Enis Sulstarova, "Orientalizmi 
shqiptar" (Albanian Orientalism), Porpjekja (The Endeavor), vol. 20, 2005, 42-60. 
13 Vepra, vol. 3, eds. N. Rahmani, F. Gunga, R. Qosja (Prishtinö: Rilindja, 1986), 9. 
1 4 Ibid. 
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In this essay I consider how these Orientalist cultural tendencies 
appear in Ismail Kadare's (1998) Elegy for Kosovo}5 Written after the 1998 
Kosovo crisis, Kadare's tale is driven by a highly Orientalist worldview. 
Culpability for one of the most significant instances of Balkan violence in 
the twentieth-century is removed from the Balkan peoples involved in it, 
while blame is assigned to the Eastern other. The Turk is this other 
responsible for Balkan violence, whereas the Balkans are depicted as 
originally European, the "roots of Europe" pamfully torn from the 
continent and placed on a path of self-annihilation by the Ottomans. 
Though Kadare's piece does not account for the entire Albanian reaction 
to the Kosovo crisis, it nevertheless reveals that Orientalist patterns of 
thinking remain viable in post-socialist Albania, and are still employed as 
a way to conceptualize the unfamiliar grounds of contemporary history. 
Rewriting Myth 
Though written in response to a contemporary conflict, Kadare's 
Elegy for Kosovo does not approach contemporary events direcdy but is 
framed as a narrative about the beginning and aftermath of the legendary 
Battle of Kosovo in 1389. This chronological regression is perhaps logical 
considering that modern territorial debates in Kosovo have always been 
intimately connected to the historical battle and its symbolic significance 
for Serbian national identity. As we know, the Serbian perception of 
Kosovo has been shaped by the mythology surrounding the lost batde in 
1389. As Charles Sinuc" has put it, while "[o]ther people sing of the 
triumphs of their conquering heroes [...] the Serbs sing of the tragic 
sense of life," and paradoxically "celebrate defeat."16 
The decasyllabic epic cycle about the Battle of Kosovo tells of how 
on the day of the battle the Serbian prince Lazar was faced with two, 
almost Christ-like choices. He could choose a kingdom on earth and thus 
defeat the Ottoman armies against whom the Serbs (and other Balkan 
nations) were standing in battle. Or, he could choose a heavenly kingdom, 
lose the batde, and martyr himself. Like Christ before him, Lazar chose 
the second alternative and led his men into battle knowing that only a 
tragic outcome could result. Yet, due to this willing sacrifice, even though 
the Battle of Kosovo paved the way for Ottoman occupation of the 
1 5 The original Albanian title was Tri kenge trie per Kosoten, which is why it is 
sometimes also translated as Three Elegies for Kosovo. 
1 6 "Preface," The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems, trans. John Matthias, Vladeta 
Vuckovic (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987), 2 September, 2010 
http://balkania.tripod.com/resources/Wstory/batde_of_kosovo.html 
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region, it has been glorified in the Serbian national imagination as an 
instance of much-celebrated martyrdom. As Longinoviö (1995) has 
argued, "the glorious defeat on the battlefield [was] transformed into a 
founding myth of the Serbian nation."17 There are obvious Christian 
overtones to Lazar's self-sacrifice and renouncement of worldly power, 
so over the year the battle has assumed special significance in Serbian 
cultural memory, while the site of Kosovo has become a Serbian 
Jerusalem of sorts. 
When placed against this background, Kadare's rewriting of the 
history of the battle, a rewriting informed by the 1998 crisis, is also a stark 
reinterpretation of a moment with tremendous symbolic weight in 
Serbian consciousness. Kadare initially narrates the disastrous defeat at 
the field of battle, and then proceeds to tell the aftermath of Kosovo 
through the eyes of two Balkan minstrels forced to migrate toward 
Western Europe. Though Kadare retains some important details of the 
original Kosovo epic cycle — such as the death of king Lazar on the 
battlefield - he also substantially reworks the traditional epic. In fact, 
though Simic suggests that the epic cycle of Kosovo was inspired by an 
inner sense of realism in the Serbian nation about the inherently tragic 
nature of life, it is in the Kadarean rewriting that one can truly feel a sense 
of cold realism in this tale; a prosaic, unheroic realism that epic poetry 
could not provide. 
In Elegy for Kosovo king Lazar is not a martyr who enters the battlefield 
to be willingly butchered. Rather, he emerges as a shrewd tactician who 
has forged several alliances in order to attain military success. This 
transformation of Lazar from self-martyring prince to battlefield strategist 
strips him of his heroic status in the original poems. Indeed, he is now 
merely one ruler among many, and with his demotion, the story of the 
battle loses its Serbian-centric nature. Thus instead of rendering the Battle 
of Kosovo as a significant event in Serbian history, Kadare depicts this 
battle as a crucial turning-point for all Balkan people, that altered their 
history and collective identity. In lieu of Serbian self-sacrifice, this 
rendering of the battle tells of unified Balkan nations at war against a 
common enemy: the Ottoman Turks. 
In so doing, Kadare downplays the regional infighting that already 
plagued the Balkans even as early as the fourteenth-century. In fact, the 
Serbian defeat at the 1371 Battle of Marica, a precursor to the Battle of 
Kosovo, was largely due to the factionalism between two members of the 
Serbian nobility, the brothers Vikasln and Ugljesa, who realized too late 
1 7 "East Within West: Bosnian Cultural Idenity in the Works of Ivo 
Andric," Ivo Andric Revisited: The Bridge Still Stands, ed. Wayne Vucinich (Berkeley: UC 
Berkeley International and Area Studies, 1995) 134. 
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the need for local unity, and perished together at the hands of Sultan 
Murad's marshal Evrenos.18 Kadare briefly hints at such antagonistic 
rapports from the period, by showing that Serbs and Albanians have 
utterly contrasting views of regional history. The Albanian minstrel sings 
calling his countrymen to arms because the Serbs are taking Kosovo, 
while the Serbian minstrel calls the Serbs to arms because the Albanians 
are taking Kosovo. Such polarized views of history might have been 
relevant in a proper discussion of the contemporary Kosovo crisis since 
they have undermined efforts of reconciliation or dialogue between Serbs 
and Albanians, yet in Kadare's story these songs of Balkan hostility are 
not treated seriously by protagonists. One is hard-pressed to find 
animosity between Balkan rulers in Kadare's descriptions of the eve of 
battle. As the Balkan princes prepare for the next day's fighting, the 
minstrels sing traditional songs about Balkan infighting while their leaders 
joke about the confusion. And when after the disastrous battle the two 
minstrel-historians set off for Europe, not only do they join hands as 
"brothers," but the Serbian minstrel borrows the Albanian lute for his 
songs after having lost his own gusla. 
This sense of Balkan togetherness is persistent throughout the story. 
All the soldiers who fight the battle bear symbols of their individual 
regions, but miraculously manage to fight together as one and ultimately 
share a communal tragic fate. Similarly, the group of Balkan refugees 
journeying toward Western Europe band together through their mass, 
pan-Balkan exodus. The message then is clear: at this stage, the Balkan 
people are as one, fighting against a common enemy who represents a 
threat to their civilization. 
In fact, the protagonists of the story seem capable of tremendous 
wisdom regarding Balkan factionalism. The awareness that fighting one 
another is likely the reason for the defeat at Kosovo is apparent 
throughout the tale and overwhelms antagonistic impulses. As the 
Albanian minstrel says to the Serbian one: "We ourselves have brought 
this disaster upon our heads, my brother! We have been fighting and 
slaughtering each other for so many years over Kosovo, and now Kosovo 
has fallen to others."19 At the face of communal defeat, the Balkan people 
realize, much too late, that they have more in common than initially 
suspected. So instead of serving as the "founding myth of the Serbian 
nation," and as such, perhaps as a polarizing historical moment, in 
John Matthias, "Introduction," The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems, trans. John 
Matthias, Vladeta Vuckovic (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987), 2 September, 2010 
http://balkania.tripod.com/resources/history/battle_of_kosovo.html. 
1 9 Ismail Kadare, Elegy for Kosovo, trans. Peter Constantine (New York: Arcade 
Publishing, 2000), 68. 
Ani Kokobobo 85 
Kadare's retelling, the battle of Kosovo is reconstituted as a common 
Balkan crisis against a much more threatening enemy. 
Blood Brotherhood 
In Kadare's view, this enemy is the Ottoman Empire, the "Eastern" 
other whose victory in Kosovo produces catastrophic results. To return 
to my previous claim about the corrective realism in Kadare's work, and 
as the work's title might also reveal, Kadare's focus in Elegy for Kosovo is 
not so much on the spiritual victory emphasized in folklore, but rather on 
the literal loss of the battle itself. Though this loss may have been 
reconceptualized as a spiritual victory in the Serbian cultural imagination, 
Kadare invites us to look at the hard cold facts. What he emphasizes is 
that the Balkan people were all fully and utterly brought to their knees by 
the Battle of Kosovo. At the end of the battle the minstrels describe the 
"all-engulfing darkness" that sets upon the world. "Down there death is 
everywhere," declare people fleeing from the Balkans, as the minstrels 
receive news of the fall of each Balkan state. Serbia is "in utter disarray" 
and "only half of Albania [is] still holding out."20 The Slovenes and the 
Croats have not fallen yet, but they too, just like the overthrown princes, 
"[have] bowed their heads to the Turkish sultan."21 The site of the battle 
has also been transformed, as rumors spread that the land will now be 
renamed "Muradie" in honor of Sultan Murad.22 This prophesied change 
of name already foreshadows the vast transformation that Kadare traces 
in the Balkans as a result of the catastrophic loss in Kosovo; the 
repercussions of the battle extend beyond the fourteenth-century all the 
way to the twentieth, shaping the past and present of the area. As Kadare 
sees it, the Eastern victory at the Battle of Kosovo stained the land and 
permanently tainted its future. 
A number of developments in the story suggest that by losing the 
battle and essentially becoming vassals of an Eastern power, the Balkan 
nations were condemned to many future misfortunes. For one, we learn 
that at the end of the battle, the Ottoman sultan is treacherously 
murdered by his own men, while his younger son Bayezid participates in 
the murder plot of his older brother, the heir apparent to the throne. 
Unlike his father and older brother, Bayezid is a representative of a 
political faction of the empire that propagates westward expansion rather 
than isolation within Asia. As the narrator notes, the new ruler's desire to 
2 0 Ibid., 73-74. 
2 1 Ibid. 
2 2 Ibid., 74. 
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conquer Europe will produce negative consequences for the Balkans. The 
future promises no respite under the dominion of a ruler who intends to 
utilize the Balkans as his pathway into Western Europe. To do so, the 
sultan needs to completely possess the Balkans, make the land his own. 
In fact, these future political agendas seem to be already set into 
motion, and this complete possession of the Balkans by the Eastern 
other, need not wait until future years. The new sultan begins his 
campaign to make region Ottoman immediately after the battle. Here 
Kadare sketches out one of those unsolved and unsolvable mysteries so 
familiar to readers of his works. When they depart the Balkans, the 
Ottomans take back to Istanbul for proper burial only the outer shell of 
the murdered sultan while burying his insides in the Plains of Kosovo. In 
a special "supplement" to the story of the battle, the narrator informs us 
that: 
[The] monarch's body [was] taken to the Ottoman capital but that his blood 
and intestines [were] buried in Christian soil of Kosovo [...] Balkan people 
believe that everything linked with blood is eternal, imperishable, and 
guarded by fate. The Turks, who had at that point interacted with the 
Balkan people for over half a century had apparendy assimilated some of 
this symbolism. By pouring the monarch's blood on the Plans of Kosovo, 
they wanted to give that plain, just as they had done with the invasion, a 
direction, a fatality, both a curse and blessing at the same time; in other 
words, a "program," as one would call it today.23 
Kadare never fully explains this bizarre act; it is, as I have mentioned, one 
of his essential narrative mysteries, yet he alludes to a few possible 
answers. 
I would suggest that one way to understand the burial of the sultan's 
blood in the Balkan land is from the perspective of traditional Balkan and 
especially Albanian cultural rituals and beliefs involving blood. Albanian 
blood vengeance laws require that spilt blood be repaid with blood, so 
one may argue that the Ottomans leave their monarch's blood in the 
Balkan Peninsula lest it vengefully rise up against them. But Kadare 
implies that even in this token Balkan appropriation, the Ottoman 
intentions go deeper and are much more sinister. Blood, after all, holds 
tremendous power. Indeed, in the words of the deceased monarch crying 
out from the Plains of Kosovo: "even a few drops of blood are enough to 
hold all the memory of the world" (121). From this perspective, then, to 
leave behind the blood of the monarch constitutes giving a "program" to 
the region, binding its fate to that of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans 
Ibid., 44. 
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not only invade or possess, but they seek a blood union with the Balkans; 
they seek to impregnate the land of Kosovo with the Ottoman DNA. 
In Balkan tradition the sort of blood-union rendered in Kadare's story 
has many important connotations. The belief that by drinking one 
another's blood two individual become joined in "blood-brotherhood" is 
widespread throughout the Balkans. In the Albanian medieval law code -
the Kanun (Code) of Lek Dugagjini — the practice is for two men to drink 
each other's blood, sometimes on top of a sugar cube, and then become 
as brothers. So strong is this bond considered that intermarriage is not 
allowed among the families of the blood brothers for at least several 
generations because they are viewed as blood relatives. In instances when 
blood-vengeance is forgiven, this same ritual of blood drinking takes 
place, and it is only through the ensuing blood-brotherhood between the 
feuding parties that the death of a loved one (blood taken) can be 
forgiven. The relatedness among families that results from the ritual, 
makes up for the blood taken through new relatives. In light of these 
practices, the blood of the Sultan on Balkan land, and the land's essential 
absorption or 'drinking' of the Ottoman blood, suggests that a coerced 
blood brotherhood has taken place between the Balkans and the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The Stain of Eastern Blood 
For Kadare, however, this involuntary brotherhood of the Balkans 
with the Ottoman Empire proves to have had extremely negative 
ramifications for the Balkans, essentially dragging the region into 
Easternness. In order to allude to this point he merges this otherwise 
realistic tale with the magical realism he is known for. At the end of the 
tale, Kadare gives voice to the ghost of the sultan buried in the Balkans, 
who delivers a "royal prayer." The spirit of Sultan Murad bemoans the 
fact that his blood and insides have been trapped in the Balkans. And 
because this portion of the tale is told from the perspective of Murad's 
spirit, temporal laws no longer apply, and the narrative kaleidoscopically 
flashes through Balkan history, beginning with the Battle of Kosovo and 
continuing up to the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. The sultan 
narrates the long aftermath of the Battle of Kosovo, tracing violent 
infighting in the Balkans through some six hundred years. 
As an observer of the region, the sultan mentions that the Balkan 
people have been on a "course of destruction" for hundreds of years, 
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place of violence, while his curse upon the Balkan people similarly pushes 
the region toward violence. 
The Balkan nations are thus dispossessed and partly exculpated of the 
regional violence that has plagued and stigmatized the region. Implicitly, 
even the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, which served as the inspiration 
for this tale, is, according to this pattern, similarly resolved by blaming the 
Eastern other. Or rather, one could say that Kadare blames the violence 
on an underground, Eastern Balkan self. Because the Sultan's blood is 
buried deep within the land, so it becomes increasingly challenging to 
draw the boundaries between an Eastern other and an Eastern self. The 
Balkans have become blood brothers with the Ottomans, they have 
grown related and thus to some extent inseparable. So the Easternness 
blamed for Balkan violence could present itself either in the guise of an 
occupier or of a self fully possessed by that occupier - a self disfigured 
through many years of occupation. Though, regardless of the source, the 
story turns the problem of Balkan violence into a struggle to escape 
Easternness. 
Out Original Western Selves 
If the epilogue with the royal prayer and the supplemental report shift 
the blame for Balkan violence onto Easternness, the rest of the story 
reaffirms these Orientalist patterns of thinking from a somewhat different 
perspective. When the minstrels reach Western Europe and receive an 
audience at the home of a prominent nobleman, Kadare presents an 
interesting apologia for Balkan violence. The Sultan's prayer is open-
ended and subjective enough to leave some room for doubt about the 
associations between Ottoman presence and Balkan violence. After all, 
the Sultan points out that the Balkan people had been fighting among one 
another for some six or seven hundred years before the Ottomans ever 
reached the region. Yet this pre-Ottoman Balkan violence is given a 
different spin by the noblewoman in Western Europe who greets the 
Balkan minstrels with great sympathy. 
When she hears the songs of the minstrels, the Western woman 
compares their epic poetry to Greek tragedies. The minstrels sing about 
"sacrifices at the foot of bridges, the Furies in the guise of washerwomen 
on the banks of a river, the idlers in the village coffeehouses, the killer 
forced to attend the funeral feast of his victim." The motifs and general 
mood of these songs "bring to mind the Greek tragedies" for the 
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noblewoman. Listening to the minstrels' songs, she concludes that 
Balkan epic poems "are the same diamond dust, the same seed" as Greek 
tragedy. This argument then leads to a discussion of origins, because if 
the Balkan epic poems are related to Greek tragedy, then the Balkans 
must somehow be related to the Hellenic cradle of Western civilization. 
Quite fittingly, Kadare has the Western woman assert that the "roots that 
had given birth to everything," to Europe herself, are in the Balkans.30 
The Balkan identity is thus defined as eminently European. Their 
penchant for infighting is merely another iteration of a Greek tragedy, 
which however terrible, still bears a certain beauty, grandeur, and 
boldness. While some of the Western Europeans hosting the Balkan 
minstrels suggest that "hate is all [the Balkans] know,"31 the explanation 
provided by the noblewoman helps them and the reader reconceptualize 
the Balkans as a place of unbridled passions, which nevertheless speaks of 
the sublimity of the human spirit, at once terrifying and beautiful. The 
noblewoman shares the reaction of Prince Bayazid at the beginning of the 
Battle of Kosovo. Mid-conversation, the young prince turns to his Greek 
tutor and says: "Anastasios...why...despite everything, am I so entranced 
by their (Balkan) madness?"32 This Balkan "madness" is made manifest 
on the battlefield as the Balkan troops appear as a "wild jumble" when 
compared to the disciplined monotony of Ottoman troops. The Ottoman 
soldiers have little identity of their own. They march forward with "no 
distinguishing features, not even a surname." As the Greek Anastasios 
suggests, it is these "shadows" who will "face those strutting Balkans and 
slash their names, their long peacock-tail titles, and ultimately slash their 
lives."33 Though spoken of mockingly by Anastasios, Balkan "madness" is 
also a form of identification, a way for strong, colorful personalities to 
assert themselves. 
And while Kadare does not explicitly condone Balkan violence, he 
presents the Balkans as Europeans whose Western inclinations have been 
disrupted by the Ottoman invasion. Though the violence problem might 
have been pertinent before the invasion, the problem is not truly 
crippling until after. Pre-invasion regional altercations between the 
nationalities, though condemned, are also romanticized and presented as 
the consequences of an unruly Balkan soul. It is only when the Sultan's 
blood is buried in the land that the Balkans acquire their genuine 
Easternness. With the occupation under way, the region is even named by 
Ibid., 100. 
Ibid., 102. 
Ibid., 97. 
Ibid., 33. 
Ibid., 32. 
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its enemy, the Ottoman Empire. The name "Balkan" is an Ottoman term 
that somehow "stuck to [the Balkans] like new scales on the body of an 
aged reptile."34 The Balkans are not so much the Eastern others of 
Europe, but rather they are coerced into an Eastern identity by the 
Ottomans. It is this involuntary assumed Easternness, like "new scales in 
the body of an aged reptile," that is blamed for the violence plaguing the 
Balkans. 
In this sense, Kadare is essentially extending many cultural myths 
about Albanian national identity - myths often worked out in his fiction -
to the entire peninsula. In works like The Three-Arched Bridge (1978) and 
Who Brought Back Doruntine? (1979) Kadare recreates cultural paradigms 
like Frasheri's about the flourishing medieval Albania, while the Slavs and 
Greeks are shown as inferior and on a mission to put an end to Albanian 
progress. Yet perhaps as evidence for the extremely fluid and relative 
nature of these patterns of "nesting orientalism," instead of pinning 
Albania against other Balkan people, Kadare is now giving the entire 
region the privileged position he granted Albania years earlier. If novels 
like The File on H (1990) showed Albanians as the oldest people in the 
Balkans, as old as the Homeric epics whose oral tradition is kept alive in 
the mountains of Albania, in Elegy for Kosovo Kadare depicts the whole 
peninsula as the roots of Europe and of Greek tragedy. The common 
enemy is now the Turk, and at the face of this much more pervasive 
Orientalism, the "nestling orientalisms" of the Balkans are put aside. 
Moreover, the story recycles the obsession with the West that 
dominated the post-socialist Albanian mentality. As Fatos Lubonja 
argues, due to their small territory, Albanians have always needed the 
alliance or friendship of a larger nation. After the fall of socialism, they 
attempted to find that friend in the West. In Elegy for Kosovo we can sense 
that this underlying desire to find an ally in the West has been applied to 
all Balkan nations. At the Western nobleman's home the Balkan minstrels 
desperately beg their host not to chase them away. "We want to be like 
you. We think like you. Don't drive us away," they say.35 Such statements 
once again reiterate that the Balkans are fundamentally European and 
should rightfully be part of the Western world. More importandy, 
however, the image of the minstrels traveling to Europe in order to 
escape the Eastern victory back home, also seems to be proposing that 
joining the West - presumably through the EU - may be the only viable 
solution to more contemporary Balkan problems. 
Kadare's piece shows that Orientalism as a mindset still has the power 
to both shape the Albanian reaction to and helps interpret for Albanians 
3 4 Ibid., 21. 
3 5 Ibid., 102. 
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contemporary history, and incidences of violence in particular. More 
importantly, however, I would suggest that like the original Orientalist 
discourse, the Orientalist discourse in Elegy for Kosovo has both theoretical 
and practical implications. Said argues that discourse and especially 
literature helped the West dominate the East and shape its reality. "My 
contention," he writes, "is that without examining Orientalism as a 
discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic 
discipline by which European culture was able to manage — and even 
produce - the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period."36 
Orientalism is thus never simple discourse, but could, in some ways, be 
seen as a type of 'performative' discourse that affects cultural perception 
in order to effect certain socio-political changes. Along these lines, then, 
and especially because of its timing, Kadare's Elegy for Kosovo is directly 
attempting to alter public perception both in the Balkans and in the West 
and thus prepare the ground for future sociopolitical changes. 
For one, Kadare distinctly seeks to bring together the Balkan people 
by essentially transposing their violent past into an Eastern other, thus 
redirecting their antagonisms and uniting them against a common enemy. 
If the blame for Balkan conflicts is to be found in the Eastern past, then 
this realization should provide the impetus for Balkan unity, a sort of 
unity that Kadare poetically depicts in Elegy for Kosovo, and the kind of 
unity that he hopes can spill from the page into reality. Moreover, the 
image of the wandering minstrels having to defend their history in front 
of a Western audience should be seen as Kadare's way of attempting to 
shape Western perceptions of the Balkans in the aftermath of a violent 
conflict in the region. It is for this reason, perhaps, that he makes a 
Western woman the greatest advocate of the Balkans. Like the minstrels, 
Kadare faces a Western audience, so he denounces the East, denounces 
the terrible burdens that history has placed on the Balkans, and declares 
the Europeanness of the region. In so doing, he hopes to transcend the 
violent crisis and the consequences that crisis may have in the Western 
perceptions of the Balkans. Painting the Balkans in the guise of the two 
wandering minstrels, the author desperately seeks union with the West in 
hopes of overcoming the Eastern legacy. 
In some ways, Elegy for Kosovo may have been prophetic because it was 
precisely at the hands of Western powers that the problem of Kosovo 
was given a solution recently, a solution more accepted abroad than 
regionally, but a solution that has not provoked the same violence of the 
past. But since the solution had to come from outside rather than inside 
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the Balkans, one wonders whether by removing accountability from the 
region about its history, Kadare is not also taking away agency as well. 
